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2Imagine a world where we were better able to direct resources to the programs doing 
the most good for people in need. Where nonprofits, philanthropists, governments and 
private-sector partners shared incentives to address our society’s most pressing 
problems. Where our commitment to creating lasting change for those facing incredible 
challenges led to a better understanding of what is moving the needle, and why. 
Pay for Success (PFS) is part of a movement toward getting better at doing good. PFS 
is an approach to contracting that ties payment for service delivery to the achievement 
of measurable outcomes. All have been accompanied by a form of social innovation 
financing, often referred to as a Social Impact Bond, in which investors provide upfront 
financing for the delivery of services and are repaid only if the services achieve a 
pre-agreed upon set of positive outcomes. 
Pay for Success: The First Generation provides a look at the ten Pay for Success 
projects that have launched in the United States–projects that have finalized contracts 
and financing, and initiated service delivery as of March 2016. It offers detailed 
comparison of U.S. PFS projects and synthesizes observations on the market’s 
development to date. It is informed by Nonprofit Finance Fund’s unique and central 
vantage point in the U.S. Pay for Success arena. This report pulls from PFS contracts 
and other publically available documents, interviews with stakeholders, and 
incorporates information and observations gleaned by NFF through its more than five 
years of experience as a field builder, funding intermediary for PFS project development, 
and investor. It examines project goals and project design; the partners and 
stakeholders involved; the underlying data, evidence, and evaluation plans; the 
governance and investment structures, including repayment terms and investor profiles; 
and project costs.  The report also provides key definitions for some terms, in an effort 
to further a common language for the PFS field.
The ten projects summarized in this report are diverse. There are few generalizations or 
conclusions that can be made about them, or about the PFS field more broadly given its 
early and rapidly evolving nature. Still, after almost five years of market development, 
it is an opportune moment to reflect on how these projects are coming to life in various 
communities, and to do so in a way that allows for comparison across projects.  We 
have developed this report for anyone looking to understand the PFS model, as well 
as those actively exploring or developing PFS projects.  We hope that this report spurs 
ongoing conversations about early lessons learned, and how these lessons might inform 
the evolution of PFS and the broader shift toward linking funding to outcomes. 
As a Community Development Financial Institution with more than 35 years of 
experience financing mission-driven organizations, Nonprofit Finance Fund is 
committed to improving the financial health of nonprofit organizations so that 
they can sustainably deliver high-quality services to enhance lives and 
communities across the Unites States. NFF has been a field builder in the Pay 
for Success space in the U.S. since 2010.  NFF’s work in this area is focused on 
helping service providers, investors, and governments understand and build 
readiness for productive participation in a U.S. social sector where providing 
and accessing capital is increasingly tied to the achievement of meaningful and 
measurable outcomes. To this end, Nonprofit Finance Fund administers the Pay 
for Success Learning Hub, www.payforsuccess.org, the leading national 
repository for education and information on Pay for Success. NFF also intermedi-
ates philanthropic and federal grant funds to support the exploration and 
development of PFS projects and has invested in PFS projects. NFF has 
conducted more than 200 PFS trainings, presentations, webinars, workshops, and 
convenings across the country for service providers, governments and investors.
         Introduction
3State of the PFS Market: As of March 2016, ten Pay for Success Projects have 
launched in the United States. These projects are the fruits of PFS activity by early 
pioneers of the model who started exploring the use of PFS as early as 2011. To date, 
the project development timeline has been about two years, on average. After a flurry 
of activity near the end of 2014, 2015 was a slow year, with only one new project 
launched. But catalytic investments in project feasibility assessment and transaction 
structuring by the federal Social Innovation Fund’s Pay for Success program in late 2014 
should result in an invigorated pace of new project launches in 2016, 2017 and 2018. 
Leading issue areas: Projects to date have clustered in three issue areas: criminal 
justice and recidivism; early childhood education; and homelessness.  This reflects 
several characteristics of the PFS model, as it was originally framed: to provide upfront 
sources of capital to fund preventive or early intervention services with the potential to 
interrupt entrenched cycles of negative social and economic outcomes, and by doing so, 
realize cost savings to the public sector.  Recidivism and homelessness have emerged 
as leading PFS issue areas because of the high cost associated with frequent and 
repetitive use of jail, prison, emergency rooms and shelters, and baseline outcomes 
which are bad enough that even marginal change would be notable.  Early childhood 
education is widely recognized as one of very few interventions demonstrated to have 
a long-term impact on a range of educational and social outcomes. The prevalence of 
these issues in early PFS projects is likely also a response to increasing national 
attention to the persistent issues of income inequality, affordable housing crises, 
criminal justice reform, and calls for more effective and sustainable solutions than what 
the status quo offers.    
Project size: There is great variation in the size of PFS projects, both by number of 
individuals served and size of investment raised. Nevertheless, there is emerging 
consensus in the field that somewhere between $5 and $10 million is appropriate 
minimum threshold for a PFS project, given both the relatively high transaction costs 
and the interest of investors (particularly commercial ones) in larger investment 
opportunities. The relatively small size of most projects, in terms of numbers of
individuals served, has led some observers to question whether or not PFS is capable of 
addressing the issue of scale, a challenge endemic to many social service interventions. 
Early results: 2015 marked an important milestone for the field when the first two 
U.S. Pay for Success projects announced their first evaluation results and determined 
investor repayment. In July, after three years of service delivery the NYC ABLE Project 
for Incarcerated Youth announced that the evaluation of the first cohort of youth served 
at Rikers Island jail showed no difference from historical data in their rates of 
recidivism over the two year period following their enrollment in the PFS-funded 
program. As a result, no success payments were made to Goldman Sachs, the sole 
investor, which triggered the use of a 75 percent guarantee by Bloomberg 
Philanthropies, acting as the guarantor. Goldman Sachs decided not to continue 
funding for a fourth year of services, a right defined in the project contract. As a result, 
the project was ended. In contrast, in October the Utah High Quality Preschool Program 
announced the first set of interim results at the end of the kindergarten year for the first 
cohort of students served. The results demonstrated that all but one student of those 
evaluated as likely to require special education services when they entered preschool 
actually required those services. As a result, Goldman Sachs—also the senior investor 
in this project—received an interim repayment based on avoided cost per student.  
These overwhelmingly positive interim results raised many questions about the validity 
of the evaluation method, the project’s costs and the appropriateness of the success 
metrics.  Still, despite these criticisms and the different outcomes for investors in these 
projects, many observers of the PFS field took away the same message from both 
projects: that the Pay for Success model worked as intended, and risk was shifted to 
the private sector to the benefit of the taxpayer. 
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4Year Launched
Service Delivery 
Term (Years)
Motivation for 
Project
Project 
Objective(s)
Individuals Served 
Geography
Issue Area
 
Initial Private 
Investment 
($ millions) [Note 2]
NYC ABLE 
Project for 
Incarcerated Youth
2012
4 (projected)
3 (actual) [Note 1]
Nearly half of 
all adolescents 
incarcerated at Rikers 
Island jail will return 
within one year of 
being discharged.
Reduce recidivism by 
at least 10 percent. 
17,287 (projected)
4,000 (actual)
New York City, NY
Recidivism
$9.6
Utah High Quality 
Preschool 
Program
2013
5
Children from 
low-income families 
have limited access 
to high-quality early 
childhood education.
-Increase school 
 readiness and
 academic performance
-Reduce the need 
 for special education 
 services.    
3,500
Salt Lake County, UT
Early Childhood 
Education
$7.0
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
2013
4
44% of formerly 
incarcerated individuals 
who are under 
community supervision 
and without 
employment return to 
prison within two 
years.
-Increase employment  
 by at least 5 percent
-Reduce recidivism by 
 at least 8 percent
2,000
New York City and 
Rochester, NY
Recidivism
$13.5
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
2014
7
55% of young adults 
who age out of juvenile 
justice system or are 
on probation will return 
to prison at least once 
within three years. Only 
30% are employed 
within one year of their 
release from prison 
or jail.
-Reduce 
 incarceration by 40%
-Increase job readiness 
 and employment
929
Boston, Chelsea and 
Springfield, MA
Recidivism
$21.7
Child-Parent Center 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
2014
4
Chicago Public Schools 
serving low-income 
families have   a  
shortage of publically-
funded, high-quality 
pre-kindergarten seats 
available.
-Increase school 
 readiness and 
 academic 
 performance
-Reduce the need for 
 special 
 education services.
2,620
Chicago, IL
Early Childhood 
Education
$16.7
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
2014
4
Children of families 
who struggle with 
homelessness 
experience longer 
stays in foster care.
Reduce the length of 
stay in foster care and 
achieve permanency 
and/or family 
reunification
135 caregivers and 
their families
Cuyahoga County, OH
Child Welfare
$4.0
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
2014
6
1,500 chronically 
homeless people in 
Massachusetts lack 
access to stable 
housing and are 
high-cost users of 
temporary shelters, 
Medicaid and other 
emergency services. 
Provide 500 units of 
stable supportive 
housing for up to 800 
chronically homeless 
individuals
800
Commonwealth of 
MA
Homelessness
$3.50
Project Welcome 
Home
2015
6
More than 2,200 
chronically homeless 
individuals in Santa 
Clara County lack 
access to stable 
housing and long-term 
supportive services.
End homelessness, 
increase stability and 
improve health by 
achieving 12 months 
of housing stability.
150-200
Santa Clara County, 
CA
Homelessness
$6.9
Housing to 
Health Initiative
2016
5
The City of Denver 
spends $7 million 
annually on emergency 
and criminal justice 
services for 250 
chronically homeless 
people who lack access 
to affordable housing 
and supportive services. 
-Achieve housing  
 stability
-Decrease jail bed 
 days
-Lack access to 
 affordable housing 
 and supportive 
 services 
250
Denver, CO
Homelessness
$8.7
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
2016
46
27 percent of children 
in South Carolina live 
in poverty, which can 
be harmful to a child’s 
cognitive development, 
health, school 
performance and 
social and emotional 
well-being. 
-Support the health 
 and development of  
 first-time mothers 
 and  their children
-Build a pathway to  
 sustainability for NFP 
 in South Carolina
-Evaluate effectiveness
 of efficiencies in NFP  
 model
3,200 mothers and 
their children
South Carolina
Maternal and Child 
Health
$17.5
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5[1] The NYC ABLE project was designed as a four year project, but gave the investor 
the option to continue funding for the fourth year based on results for the first year of 
participants after a two-year evaluation period. This interim evaluation demonstrated no 
impact on recidivism, so the program was ended after the third year of service delivery. 
[2] This category captures the initial private investment raised to support the project 
that has the potential to be repaid if the project achieves its pre-determined out-
comes. Many projects, particularly those in the supportive housing and health arenas, 
leverage existing public resources, such as subsidized housing and health insurance, 
to achieve program impact; the value of these resources is not included in these dollar 
values but are discussed in more detail in Sections 7, 8 and 9 of this report. 
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6Multi-stakeholder partnerships present an opportunity for cross-sector 
collaboration. PFS projects are, by nature, multi-stakeholder partnerships, with each 
type of stakeholder fulfilling a distinct set of roles and responsibilities (as defined in 
Table 2 and below). PFS projects also rely on the partnership and robust participation 
of many sectors: government, nonprofit, private, philanthropic, and academic.  Most 
project roles are filled by organizations or companies with expertise or experience that 
translates directly to the PFS project, but there is a significant learning curve for all 
parties involved when it comes to understanding the PFS model and its applicability in 
the local context, establishing shared goals, and finding a common language to 
negotiate project terms.
Stakeholders must reconcile different, and sometimes shifting, motivations. 
PFS projects are only possible when the diverse stakeholders involved can find 
alignment in their goals and priorities, and the project development process (including 
earlier exploration and feasibility assessment phases) is the process through which this 
alignment emerges, or is negotiated.  Nevertheless, project participants are motivated by 
different elements of the PFS model, and these motivations can change during the life 
of the project. For service providers, the initial draw to PFS is often the opportunity to 
access unrestricted, multi-year funding—a powerful alternative to the cycle of annual 
or biannual contract negotiations with government funders. Alternately, or over the life 
of the project, service providers may see PFS as an opportunity change how government 
buys social services, in both what they prioritize and what they pay for these services. 
For example, Center for Employment Opportunities hopes that PFS will lead it to a 
pay-for-performance contract with the state Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision that covers their full cost of services, so for them the PFS experience is a 
chance to pilot this potential arrangement and demonstrate its value to state partners. 
Also, while initial conversations about the PFS model in the United States emphasized 
the model’s suitability for services that can realize cost savings to government, Santa 
Clara County has been explicit that their chronic homelessness project may not achieve 
savings over the course of the project term. Nonetheless, achieving stability and 
improved health for the chronically homeless population is valuable, and more 
important, the project will demonstrate that the permanent supportive housing model 
is more effective than the status quo of services the county provides. Thus, the county 
was willing to assign a dollar value to a successful outcome. 
Still, for most governments cost savings and avoided costs remain a powerful 
motivation for governments for pursuing PFS, though over the course of project devel-
opment and implementation, they may come to value the opportunity that PFS projects 
offer to address chronic community needs in a data-driven and results-oriented way. 
Transaction coordinators manage the complex project development process. 
The scope of duties of a transaction coordinator can include: general project 
management and stakeholder engagement; definition and valuation of target outcomes 
and success payments; evaluation design; investment capital structuring and raising; 
development and negotiation of project contracts and investment agreements; and 
development of program operational plans and repayment schedules.  Transaction 
coordinators also often conduct the initial feasibility assessment to determine the 
viability of the PFS model for a particular issue area, organization or geography. Social 
Finance US and Third Sector Capital Partners are both early proponents of the PFS model 
in the United State and have developed their business models around filling the 
transaction coordinator role.  But the transaction coordinator role has also been filled, in 
whole or part, by community development financial institutions (Enterprise, IFF and CSH), 
a research and evaluation organization (MDRC), and philanthropy (United Way 
organizations in Utah and Massachusetts).  Several projects have also had partnerships of 
several organizations fulfilling the transaction coordinator role. The diversity of 
organizations acting as transaction coordinators is a reflection of the scope of tasks 
and responsibilities captured in the transaction coordinator role. It also demonstrates 
that there are skill sets and expertise from other sectors that PFS project development 
requires. For example, CDFIs and other funding intermediaries can bring experience in 
capital raising and structured finance, while a research and evaluation organizations can 
bring experience with program design and monitoring.
In the project implementation phase, most projects retain an intermediary 
organization as a project manager. Generally speaking, the project manager is the 
lead contractor with the payor and contracts directly with the other parties providing 
services or funding to the PFS project: the service provider, the investors, the technical 
assistance provider, legal counsel, and/or evaluator.  In most cases, the project manag-
er is the same entity that served as the transaction coordinator. Project managers are 
responsible for reporting to both the investors and the payor, and play a leadership role 
in convening the committees and working groups that make up the project’s 
        Section 2: Project Partners
7governance and monitoring structure. Some project managers also play an active role in 
performance management. For example, in the New York State Increasing Public Safety 
and Employment Project, Social Finance US meets with the service provider and the parole 
bureau on a regular basis to review key program outputs, such as referrals and enroll-
ments, and identifies and supports implementation of possible course corrections. Project 
managers may also play the role of fiscal sponsor, or may contract for these services. The 
fiscal sponsor manages the project’s cash flow and accounting. 
Most PFS activity is at state or county level, with government at that level acting as 
the payor for outcomes at the end of the project service delivery period. 
To date, no project has had a federal agency as the payor, though federal government played a 
catalytic role in two early projects: the New York State Increasing Public Safety and 
Employment Project, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Juvenile Justice PFS 
Program. In both cases, the state received grant funds through the Workforce Innovation Fund, 
a competitive process sponsored by the U. S. Department of Labor to incentivize the use of PFS 
to address the related issues of recidivism and unemployment. Grant funds received through 
this process are being used in whole or part to fund outcome payments, in combination with 
resources committed by the states themselves
Technical assistance is a critical part of the project development and 
implementation phases.  In particular, support from the Government Performance Lab has 
been integral to most early projects. The Government Performance Lab (formerly the Harvard 
Kennedy School SIB Lab) offers a technical assistance model that embeds a full-time staffer 
within government to provide expertise on the PFS model as well as added capacity for data 
analysis, project design and evaluation. Government Performance Lab fellows also act as the 
liaison and coordinator for day-to-day activity during the exploration, feasibility assessment 
and/or transaction structuring phases of project development, thus providing critical focus to 
the project in the capacity-constrained environment of government where competing political 
priorities can make it difficult for staff to devote time to PFS.  The work of the Government 
Performance Lab and its fellows has been supported by philanthropy since its inception, and 
more recently, by the federal Social Innovation Fund, and has acted as an in-kind contribution 
to early projects.  In the project implementation phase, technical assistance is mostly directed 
to service providers for the purposes of ensuring fidelity to an evidence-based program model 
and/or maintaining a culture of performance management and continuous improvement in order 
to deliver on project outcomes.  This type of assistance has a role in projects that are scaling 
existing programs, or transplanting programs from other locations or service providers. 
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Service Provider(s)
[Note 1]
Payor(s) 
[Note 2]
Transaction 
Coordinator(s)
[Note 3]
Evaluator
[Note 4]
Validator
[Note 5]
Project 
Manager
[Note 6]
External 
Legal Counsel
[Note 7]
Technical 
Assistance 
Provider(s) 
[Note 8]
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
Massachusetts 
Housing 
and Shelter Alliance
[Note 11]
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts
-Massachusetts 
 Housing and Shelter 
 Alliance
-CSH
-United Way of 
 Massachusetts Bay 
 and Merrimack Valley
 
Root Cause Institute
none
Massachusetts 
Alliance for 
Supportive Housing 
[Note 12]
-Nixon Peabody LLC
-Goulston & Storrs
-Weil, Gotshal &  
 Manges LLP
-Government 
 Performance  Lab
-CSH
NYC ABLE 
Project for 
Incarcerated Youth
-Friends of Island 
Academy
-The Osborne Asso-
Association
New York City 
Department of 
Corrections
MDRC
Vera Institute of 
Justice
none
MDRC
Debevoise
-MDRC 
-Correctional 
 Counseling, Inc.
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
-Granite School District
-Park City School 
 District
-Guadalupe School
-YMCA of 
 Northern Utah
-Children’s Express
-Lit’l Scholars
United Way of Salt 
Lake; Salt Lake 
County (cohort 1)
State of Utah 
(cohorts 2-5)
United Way of 
Salt Lake
Utah State 
University
none
United Way of Salt 
Lake
-Holland & Hart LLP 
-Mannatt 
-Voices for Utah 
 Children
-Granite School  
 District
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
Center for 
Employment 
Opportunities
-New York State 
 Department of Labor
-US Department of  
 Labor  [Note 9]
Social Finance US 
-NYS DOCCS 
 Research
-NYS DOL Research
Chesapeake Research 
Associates
Social Finance
Jones Day
Government 
Performance Lab
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
Roca Inc.
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts
US Department of 
Labor [Note 9]
Third Sector Capital 
Partners
-Sibalytics LLC
-The Urban Institute
Public Consulting 
Group
Third Sector Capital 
Partners
-Goulston & Storrs P.C.
-Nixon Peabody LLC 
-Goodwin Procter LLC 
-Ropes & Gray LLC 
-Government 
 Performance Lab
-Chapin Hall
Child-Parent Center 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
Chicago 
Public Schools 
Child-Parent Center
City of Chicago
Board of Education 
of City of Chicago 
[Note 10]
IFF
SRI International
none
IFF
-Kirkland & Ellis LLP
-DLA Piper 
-Chapman and 
 Culler LLP
-Government 
 Performance Lab
-Metropolitan Family 
 Services 
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
FrontLine
Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio
Third Sector Capital 
Partners
Case Western Reserve 
University
none
Enterprise 
Community Partners
Kutak Rock
-University of 
 Maryland 
-Third Sector Capital  
 Partners 
Project 
Welcome Home
Abode Services
Santa Clara 
County, California
Third Sector 
Capital Partners
University of California, 
San Francisco School of 
Medicine
none
none
-Fenwick & West LLP 
-Gibson, Dunn & 
 Crutcher LLP
-Miles & Stockbridge P.C.
-Third Sector Capital 
 Partners
-Palantir 
 Technologies
Housing to Health 
Initiative
-Colorado Coalition 
  for the Homeless
-Mental Health 
 Center of Denver
City/County of 
Denver, Colorado
-Enterprise 
 Community Partners 
-CSH
-Social Impact 
 Solutions, Inc.
Urban Institute
TBD
-Enterprise 
 Community Partners
-CSH
Kutak Rock
Government 
Performance Lab
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
Nurse-Family 
Partnership [Note 123]
South Carolina 
Department of Health 
and Human Services
Social Finance US
J-PAL 
North America
none
Social Finance US 
[Note 14]
-WilmerHale
-Nelson Mullins 
-Riley & 
 Scarborough LLP
Government 
Performance Lab
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9[10] The City of Chicago and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Chicago 
Public Schools) are both payors but are paying for different success outcomes. City of 
Chicago is paying for outcomes related to kindergarten readiness and third-grade 
literacy, while Chicago Public Schools is paying for an outcome related to avoided 
special education costs. 
[11] Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance is the lead service provider, 
responsible for contracting with a number of its member organizations for PFS project 
implementation. Organizations eligible to participate are named in the contract with 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and include: Action, Inc.; Boston Public Health 
Commission; Commonwealth Land Trust, Inc.; Eliot Human Services; Father Bill’s & 
Mainspring; Friends of the Homeless; Heading Home, Inc.; Hearth, Inc.; HomeStart, Inc.; 
Housing Assistance Corporation/Duffy Health Center; Lynn Shelter Association; Mental 
Health Associates; Pine Street Inn; and South Middlesex Opportunity Council. 
[12] Massachusetts Alliance for Supportive Housing (MASH) is a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the Massachusetts Housing and Shelter Alliance with its own staff and 
governance board. MASH contracts with the United Way of Massachusetts Bay and 
Merrimack Valley as the fiscal agent for the project and CSH as the technical assistance 
provider; both organizations are members of MASH. 
[13] Implementing agencies for the South Carolina project are: Spartanburg Regional 
Health Care System; Greenville Health System; Carolina Health Centers, Inc.; SC DHEC 
Low Country Region; SC DHEC Pee Dee Region; SC DHEC Midlands Region; SC DHEC 
Upstate Region; McLeod Home Health; SC Office of Rural Health Orangeburg Healthy 
Start. 
[14] The Children’s Trust Fund of South Carolina is the fiscal agent for the project.  
[1] Delivers program interventions to target population over the course of the PFS contract
[2] Makes payments when pre-determined outcomes have been met
[3] Designs and structures PFS project and financing model; raises capital; manages 
stakeholders
[4] Design and implement plan for determining whether outcomes have been met
[5] Verify accuracy of data used in evaluation plan, or evaluation plan itself
[6] Intermediary during service delivery phase, and/or fiscal sponsor for project funds
[7] Provide assistance in drafting, reviewing and negotiating PFS contracts
[8] Provide support and expertise to project stake-holders in the project development 
and/or project implementation phases
[9] Both New York State and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts were the recipients of 
grant funds from the United States Department of Labor, awarded through a 
competitive process through the Workforce Innovation Fund. Grant funds received through 
this process are being used in whole or part to fund outcome payments, in combination 
with resources committed by the states themselves. In both cases, the PFS contract is held 
by the state, so the federal agency is not the payor of record. 
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Early conversations about the PFS model defined it as a tool to scale proven 
programs, or programs with some degree of evidence demonstrating their effective-
ness. To date, most PFS projects have fit this model: all but three projects have used PFS 
funding to finance an increase in the number of people served by a particular program 
or service provider. In this way, PFS can be a powerful tool to address a trend that many 
service providers report in Nonprofit Finance Fund’s State of the Nonprofit Sector Sur-
vey: that demand for services in their communities exceeds their capacity to respond.  
In several cases, PFS projects have introduced new services. The most notable 
example of this is the NYC ABLE Project for Incarcerated Youth, the first-ever PFS 
project in the United States. This project introduced a therapeutic intervention to 
juvenile offenders held at Rikers Island jail; previously, there were no therapeutic 
services available to this population while in jail.  The intervention, a type of cognitive 
behavioral therapy called Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT), had been used and studied 
with other demographics and in other settings. Transplanting what are considered best 
or promising practices from other locations and target populations speaks to an appetite 
in the social and public sectors to replicate and refine existing programs instead of 
designing new ones. This philosophy is at the heart of the federal Social Innovation 
Fund, a catalytic supporter of PFS activity, which describes its goal as “finding what 
works, and making it work for more people.”  
In other cases, PFS projects have combined services. In Cuyahoga County, the 
Partnering for Family Success program combines a set of services, all of which had 
evidence of effectiveness supporting them but which had never been studied in 
combination. The core intervention that all participants receive is Critical Time 
Intervention, which has been subject to two randomized control trials for similar, but not 
identical, target populations; the other interventions, which are to be provided based on 
the unique needs of each participant, are also supported by different levels of evidence.  
Similarly, in Denver, the Housing to Health initiative uses two well-researched 
interventions, permanent supportive housing and Assertive Community Treatment, in 
combination. Both projects rely on very specific and intentional identification of the 
target population, so an added element of what is being demonstrated through the PFS 
model is the effectiveness of this targeting in achieving the target outcomes for the project. 
PFS projects can allow for rare flexibility in program design and delivery. In 
the NYC, Cuyahoga County and Denver projects, a PFS model allowed for flexibility in 
designing and delivering services that standard government contracts for social services 
do not usually allow for. This speaks to a large, and unmet, demand for funding sources 
that can support transformation in social service delivery.  
There is an ongoing debate in the growing PFS community about whether 
PFS is most appropriate as a tool to scale or replicate proven models, or to 
introduce or adapt services to new settings. Early experience suggests that there 
is room for both approaches and that the question of scaling versus transplanting will 
be resolved on a project-by-project basis as part of the process of project development. 
How the question is resolved is a reflection of local needs, service provider landscape 
and capacity, and government and investor priorities and risk tolerances.  However, 
using PFS to transplant interventions or demonstrate the effect of new combinations 
of services underscores the need for robust feasibility assessment to determine the 
likelihood that an intervention can be implemented successfully with a new population 
or in a new location, and often some adjustment of expected outcomes to reflect a more 
conservative estimate of impact given the unknowns around the new target population 
or geography. This iterative analysis can lengthen project development timelines. PFS 
models which transplant practices from elsewhere also must consider the capacity of 
local service providers to implement service models with fidelity, which can involve 
technical assistance or monitoring from expert providers or consultants. 
For programs that are scaling using PFS, the level of evidence supporting the 
intervention varies. Even the most studied social service interventions do not have 
more than a handful of rigorous experimental evaluations. This is a testament to the 
relative paucity of studies of social programs.  And, it seems that payors still value 
data drawn from the local context above all else. For example, though there are several 
decades of research on the impacts of early childhood education, the Utah and Chicago 
projects used studies of their respective interventions to estimate impacts for their 
projects. Similarly, the Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness PFS project relied pri-
marily on a longitudinal data on the Home and Healthy for Good program to model PFS 
program impact, though the permanent supportive housing model has many decades of 
research on its impacts and cost-effectiveness. To be sure, the larger bodies of evidence 
surrounding these interventions played a reinforcing role, but having local data on past 
performance can serve as a risk mitigation factor for government and investors. Given 
         Section 3: Evidence and Program Design
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the scarcity of studies on social programs, it will not be feasible in most settings and 
would exclude most service providers and programs from participating in PFS projects 
if having local evaluation data became a qualifying factor to developing projects and 
selecting partners. 
Project implementation necessitates a changed, and deepened, relationship 
between the public sector and the service provider.  This is an innovation in 
itself, and is a part of all PFS projects, regardless of the level of evidence underlying the 
project. Government must work closely with service providers to define, identify, and in 
many cases, refer the target population for services so that the outcomes and impacts 
prioritized by the payor have the greatest likelihood of being achieved. This partnership 
takes different forms:  regular meetings of stakeholder working groups; government 
sending a list of priority individuals to a service provider for their outreach and recruit-
ment; or a dedicated staff member in government who coordinates the referral process. 
In any scenario, the resources and time dedicated by the government partner is critical 
to project success in a way that it is not in standard government contracts or grants to 
service providers. 
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Service Intervention(s) Model 
and/or Type
Evidence base for intervention
Has effectiveness of the intervention 
for PFS project target population been 
evaluated?
Has the service provider provided this 
intervention previously?
Is PFS project:
-scaling an existing intervention by  
 replicating at a larger scale?
-demonstrating the effect of a new 
  program model or combination of services?
-transplanting an existing intervention(s)
  to a new target population and/or 
  service delivery setting?
NYC ABLE Project 
for Incarcerated 
Youth
Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy: Moral 
Reconation Therapy
Meta-analysis of 
Cognitive Behavioral 
Therapy [Note 1]
No
No
Transplanting
Utah High Quality 
Preschool 
Program
Half-day preschool: 
Utah High Quality 
Prekindergarten 
Program model
2  comparative 
studies [Note 2]
Yes
Partly [Note 3]
Scaling
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
Transitional Work: 
CEO Transitional 
Work model
-1 RCT
-Provider 
 performance data
Yes
Yes
Scaling
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
Transitional Work 
and Case 
Management:
High Risk Youth 
Intervention Model
Provider 
performance data
Yes
Yes
Scaling
Child-Parent 
Center Pay for 
Success Initiative
Half-day preschool: 
Child-Parent Center
1 longitudinal study, 
quasi-experimental 
design
Yes
Yes
Scaling
Partnering for 
Family 
Success Program
-Critical Time 
 Intervention
-Child Parent 
 Psychotherapy
-Trauma Adapted 
 Family Connections
Critical Time 
Intervention: 2 RCTs, 
1 experimental 
research design
[Notes 4 and 5]
Partly [Note 4]
Partly [Note 5]
Demonstrating;
Transplanting
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
Home and 
Healthy  for Good 
Program 
-Provider 
 performance data
-Medicaid data 
 analysis [Note 6]
Yes
Yes
Scaling
Project 
Welcome Home
-Permanent 
 supportive housing
 
-Assertive 
 Community 
 Treatment
-Permanent 
 Supportive Housing: 
 15 experimental/ 
 quasi-experimental 
 studies [Note 7]
 -Assertive 
 Community Treament: 
 27 experimental/  
 quasi-experimental 
 studies [Note 8]
Yes
Yes
Scaling
Housing to 
Health Initiative
-Permanent 
Supportive housing
-Assertive 
 Community 
 Treatment
-Permanent 
 Supportive Housing: 
 15 experimental/ 
 quasi-experimental 
 studies [Note 7]
 -Assertive 
 Community Treament: 
 27 experimental/ 
 quasi-experimental  
 studies [Note 8]
Yes
Yes
Demonstrating; 
Scaling
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
3 RCTs
Yes
Yes
Scaling; 
 
         Table 3: Evidence and Program Design
13
[1] The estimated impact of the ABLE Program was based on a meta-analysis of 58 
evaluations of different models of cognitive behavioral therapy programs serving 
different subsets of a criminal offender population in different settings. Moral Recona-
tion Therapy (MRT), the intervention used by the ABLE Program, is a type of cognitive 
behavioral therapy. MDRC conducted a literature review that determined that all of 
the models of CBT achieved comparable results as long as they were implemented as 
originally intended by program designers. MRT was selected as the type of cognitive 
behavioral therapy to implement at Rikers Island based on existing evidence as well as 
fit of the model with the unique conditions and operational challenges of the jail set-
ting.  For more information, see MDRC’s Financing Promising Evidence-Based Programs: 
early lessons from the New York City Social Impact Bond (http://www.mdrc.org/sites/
default/files/Financing_Promising_evidence-Based_Programs_FR.pdf). 
[2] The Utah High Quality Preschool Program was evaluated as part of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education’s Early Learning First program.  The research design was a two-group 
comparative design with pre-, mid- and post-assessment, and compared students in 15 
classrooms receiving the program with twelve classrooms deemed to be at a similar 
risk level. The project was conducted over three academic years, 2006-07 to 2008-09, 
with an independent evaluation each year of the project. Another study funded by the 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation compared students receiving the Utah High Quality Preschool 
Program with students not receiving preschool services in the 2012-12 school year. 
[3] The Granite School District developed and has implemented the Utah High Quality 
Prekindergarten Program since 2006. Some of the independent service providers had 
been implementing the intervention prior to the PFS program with grant funding through 
Voices for Utah Children. 
[4] Critical Time Intervention has been subject to two randomized control trials. Both 
studied the impact of C.T.I. on individuals with severe mental illness; one study popu-
lation was exclusively male. A modified randomized trial studied the impact of C.T.I. on 
episodically homeless families. While none of these study groups is an exact match to 
the target population for the Partnering for Family Success program—caregivers expe-
riencing homelessness whose children have been placed in foster care—there is some 
overlap with the populations served in the three studies. 
[5] All of the participants in the Partnering for Family Success program receive C.T.I., 
which Frontline staff is experienced in providing. The other interventions are to be pro-
vided on as-needed basis to meet clients’ specific needs; Frontline Staff is not experi-
enced in implementing all of these interventions. 
[6] The Home and Healthy for Good has been contracted to the Massachusetts Housing 
and Shelter Alliance by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts since 2006. As a condi-
tion of funding, MHSA reports on the self-reported usage of health and social services 
and quality of life outcomes for participants served by the program; participants are 
surveyed monthly, and in some cases, quarterly. State Medicaid analysts have also 
reviewed billing claims for a subset of participants to determine their actual Medicaid 
costs in the year prior to and after moving into housing. This local data informs the de-
sign of the Massachusetts PFS project, although the larger body of evidence supporting 
permanent supportive housing’s cost-effectiveness and impact were also weighed in 
making the case for this project. 
[7] The evidence base for permanent supportive housing is summarized by the Wash-
ington State Institute for Public Policy, which includes a cost-benefit analysis based 
on studies using  a comparison and treatment group,  available at:  http://www.
wsipp.wa.gov/BenefitCost/ProgramPdf/284/Supported-housing-for-chronically-home-
less-adults
[8] The evidence base for assertive community treatment  is summarized by the Wash-
ington State Institute for Public Policy, which includes a cost-benefit analysis based 
on studies using a  comparison and treatment group,  available at: http://www.wsipp.
wa.gov/BenefitCost/ProgramPdf/283/Assertive-Community-Treatment. These studies 
are not all specific to a chronically homeless population.  
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Evaluation is a central component of PFS.  Program evaluation, whether interim 
or final, triggers repayment of the initial PFS investment, and any additional payments 
tied to higher levels of impact or success. Evaluations can be paid for by either funds 
raised through the PFS financing process, or separately by philanthropy or government. 
In either scenario, payment for the evaluation must not be tied in any way to the 
achievement of the outcomes, nor can the evaluator have a financial interest or stake in 
the project.
PFS offers the opportunity to build the evidence base for social service 
interventions. Most social service interventions are unstudied or understudied, 
particularly with the level of rigor that is routine in other fields like medicine. Thus, PFS 
projects provide an important opportunity to build the base of research for existing 
programs. And, many hope that the use of rigorous experimental evaluation 
methodologies will go beyond answering the relatively simple question of whether or 
not an intervention works,  and address questions of how, why and for whom it works. 
A slight majority of projects to date have used a randomized control trial (RCT), 
considered the gold standard of evaluation design.  An RCT relies on comparison to 
a group of individuals randomly assigned to a control group that does not receive the 
services being evaluated.  For government, an RCT may be seen as the best possible 
way of ensuring that they are paying for outcomes that would not have been achieved 
otherwise; likewise, some investors and stakeholders in the PFS market feel strongly 
that the use of an RCT is critical in order to establish the rigor of the PFS model. Some 
service providers embrace the opportunity to undergo an RCT because they see it as 
a way of demonstrating their impact, confidence in their approach, and willingness to 
subject themselves to broader scrutiny.
There is a growing consensus on how critical it is to involve the project 
evaluator as early as possible in the program design process. An initial assess-
ment of a program’s evaluability, or its ability to be tied to a set of outcomes which can 
be observed in reasonable period of time, is often part of the feasibility assessment 
phase of project development. Projects which are not evaluable, for reasons of 
complexity, correlation, or lack of obvious concrete and measurable outcomes, are not a 
likely fit for PFS. Early engagement of an evaluator in program design comes at a cost, 
which adds to the overall cost of the project development process. In early 2016, the 
Urban Institute started providing in-kind support for early evaluation work to PFS 
projects under development, through a grant from the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation. Local and regional universities and research centers have also played a key 
role in early-stage evaluation design.
Data used in evaluations tends to come from government, and in some cases 
service providers. The use of administrative data, or data which is routinely collected 
or generated by government, in PFS evaluations is considered a promising practice for 
the field for several reasons. First, administrative data is critical to demonstrating the 
fiscal impact of PFS program success; for example, administrative data on jail bed days 
used can be document that there was reduced bed utilization, which results in cost 
savings or avoided costs. Second, use of administrative data is one way of reducing the 
cost of project evaluation, particularly for experimental or quasi-experimental designs 
which are longitudinal and/or rely on comparison to a control group; the alternative 
of collecting data from participant and control groups through surveys or interviews is 
much more time-consuming and expensive, and more likely to result in incomplete data 
sets.  Concerns about the relatively high cost of evaluation (and RCTs in particular), and 
the diversion of PFS funds away from direct service delivery, have motivated exploration 
of low-cost approaches to RCT design and the use of administrative data is a key feature 
of these efforts. 
Access to administrative data is also required in the project development 
phase in order to establish baselines and model potential outcomes. Often, this 
data is confidential or sensitive, and may be governed by regulations around privacy; 
for example, medical data is strictly governed by HIPAA requirements, and many states 
restrict access to wage data. In order to finalize project models, transaction coordinators 
must secure data-sharing agreements with government, often with several agencies or 
departments. In some cases, public agencies and departments must also enter into 
intra-governmental data sharing agreements. Securing the necessary data-sharing 
agreements has proven to be a source of delays to many projects under development.  
And, the magnitude of the task of extracting and sharing data should not be understated, 
even with the proper agreements in place. Access relies on partners within the 
government who understand what the goals of the project are, and have the capacity 
and time to pull the data and, if necessary, present it in a format that protects 
individuals’ confidentiality. 
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Many projects are actually tracking multiple indicators and outcomes, though 
success payments have been tied to no more than four outcomes per project.  
Those outcomes tend to be ones that can be most easily tied to available administra-
tive data for the reasons cited above. Despite differences in projects, only a handful of 
outcomes have been used: namely, utilization of jail or prison beds; academic readiness 
and achievement; and stable tenancy in housing. Still, projects define these outcomes 
with different metrics and methods of measurement.  
PFS program evaluations also have the potential to tell a more robust 
story about program impact, beyond whether or not outcomes tied to success 
payments were achieved. This is important given the limited universe of studies and 
evaluations of most social service interventions; PFS projects can be another way of 
building the evidence base and can hopefully provide valuable data and insight that al-
lows for deeper analysis of not just whether or not a project met its intended outcome, 
but perhaps, why it was or was not effective. Further, these evaluations can counterbal-
ance the concern that many service providers have about PFS or other outcomes-based 
financing mechanisms: that the impacts they have on their clients’ lives will be reduced 
to just one or two measures, and that less tangible, or harder to measure, impacts will 
be ignored.  
Being subject to any rigorous third-party evaluation bears considerable 
reputational risk for a service provider, and this risk is higher in a PFS 
project. Depending on how the evaluation is set up and how results from a PFS project 
are messaged and communicated, the failure of a project to repay investors can quickly 
be interpreted to mean that a service provider and/or intervention is ineffective. These 
labels or conclusions can carry forward without an appreciation for other effects 
produced by a service providers’ work, even beyond those captured or tracked in the 
program evaluation. This further underscores the important role that program evalua-
tions can have in telling a full story about program effect, as well as the important and 
challenging work to be done by the field in developing messaging and communications 
around PFS program results. 
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Evaluation Design 
Methodology
Data Source(s) for 
Evaluation
Outcomes Tied 
to Success 
Payments
Outcomes
Tracked, Not 
Tied to Success 
Payments
Length of 
Evaluation Period
NYC ABLE Project  for 
Incarcerated Youth
Quasi-experimental: 
regression discontinuity 
using historical baseline
-New York City Department 
 of Corrections; 
-New York City Office of 
 Management and Budget 
1) Number of participants   
served
2) Total jail days avoided
-Intensity/dosage of 
 service and progress   
 through program stages; 
-Number of safety 
 incidents/conflicts
4 years (projected)
3 years (actual)
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
Longitudinal study
Granite School 
District
1) Use of special 
education and reme-
dial services
-Math and reading 
 proficiency
-Secondary and   
 post-secondary school
 completion
-College readiness
-Connection to health 
 insurance and health 
 care provider
12 years
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
RCT
-New York State   
 unemployment 
 insurance database
-NYS Department of  
 Corrections and 
 Community 
 Supervsion
-Service provider
1) Number of jail/
prison bed-days
2) Engagement in 
transitional job
[Note 1]
3) Increases in 
employment
None
5.5 years
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
RCT
-Massachusetts 
 unemployment 
 insurance database
-Service provider
1) Number of jail/pris-
on bed-days avoided
2) Job readiness 
[Note 2]
3) Increases in 
employment
-GED/High School 
 completion
-College enrollment
7 years
Child-Parent Center 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
Quasi-experimental: 
Propensity Score 
matching
Board of 
Education of Chicago 
Public Schools
1) Kindergarten 
readiness
2) Avoided use of 
special education 
services
3) Third Grade 
Literacy
-Student mobility 
 and retention
-Improvements in 
 social-emotional  
 learning
-Parent engagement
-School attendance
17 years
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
RCT
- Homeless 
 Management 
 Information  System
-Statewide 
 Automated Child  
 Welfare 
 Information System
1) Days in out-of-
home placement for 
children
Family 
reunification
(Note 3)
5 years
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness Pay 
for Success Initiative
Validated data
Service providers
1) Stable housing for 
at least one year
-Health care service 
 usage
-Number of nights 
 spent in shelter
-Number of days 
 incarcerated
   
5.25 years
Project 
Welcome Home
-Validated service  
 provider data 
-RCT [Note 4]
Santa Clara Valley 
Health and Hospital 
System, Homeless 
Management 
Information System; 
Criminal Justice Infor-
mation Control; service 
provider
1) Months of stable 
tenancy
Health care, social 
service and criminal 
justice system 
utilization
6 years
Housing to Health 
Initiative
-Validated service
 provider data 
-RCT [Note 5]
-Service providers 
-Denver Sherriff 
 Department
1) Housig stability
2)Jail bed days
Emergency services, 
shelter and 
criminal justice 
system utilization
5.25 years
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
RCT
-Service providers
-State of South Carolina
1) Reduction in preterm 
births
2) Reduction in childhood 
hospitalization and 
emergency department 
use due to injury
3) Increase in health 
spacing between births
4) Increase in number of 
first-time moms served in 
high-poverty ZIP codes
TBD-School readiness
75 years
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[1] Transitional, or subsidized, work, is central to the Center for Employment 
Opportunities’ intervention model as a critical step toward achieving employment and 
avoiding recidivism. 
[2] Job readiness is measured by the intensity of engagement and level of participation 
that a participant demonstrates with their assigned service provider staff person during 
a given period. 
[3] Evaluator will also conduct a two-year implementation study to determine how 
different components of the program implementation relate to reduction in out-of-home 
placement days. 
[4] The evaluator will use data generated by the service provider to determine whether 
stable tenancy has been achieved. This is what triggers investor repayment. The RCT 
will be used to examine differences in health services, social services and criminal 
justice system utilization, as a means of determining the impact of the PFS program 
beyond its effect on housing stability, including how permanent supportive housing 
generates efficiencies and economic benefit for Santa Clara County. 
[5] The evaluator will also implement a process study to collect data on program 
implementation. Data collected through this study will be used to institute mid-course 
corrections as necessary and help interpret results of the RCT. 
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All types of stakeholders can be, and usually are, involved in early learning 
and exploration of PFS at the local level.  The mechanism for bringing service 
providers into almost all projects to date has been a government procurement process, 
usually in the form of one or more requests for proposals (RFP) to solicit the services of 
a transaction coordinator and a lead service provider. The two exceptions are the Utah 
and Chicago projects, where PFS is being used to expand programs already operating in 
public schools.  In some cases, governments have issued earlier requests for informa-
tion (RFI), to solicit ideas of potential areas for PFS application. 
PFS offers service providers the opportunity to deepen impact and advance 
their missions by accessing hard-to-come-by capital for organizational growth 
and/or innovation. But, participating in a PFS project demands a lot from a service 
provider. To date, service providers that have been selected for PFS projects have been 
predominantly single-issue or single-model organizations with decades of experience in 
implementation, and many have invested at least a decade in developing and refining 
their service delivery models, performance management and data collection systems, 
human capital and strategic planning. Many observers of the field, including many 
service providers, feel that the bar is too high, and that most service providers will not 
be able to meet these standards. Thus, there is a danger that PFS becomes a solution 
or option for only the smallest number of organizations and perpetuates an inequity in 
the social service sector. On the flip side, there is the danger that service providers jump 
at the chance to participate in a PFS project without a full consideration of the financial 
and reputational risks of participation, or a full understanding of their program delivery 
costs, infrastructure needs and the time it will take from high-level staff to be involved 
in program design and ongoing monitoring during the implementation phase.  
Service providers are excited about continuous improvement. As mission-driven 
organizations, many service providers are eager for opportunities to better understand 
their impact on the communities and populations they serve, so they are excited by 
the potential that PFS offers to pursue longer-term and more rigorous evaluations of 
their program models in a way they have not been able to do before. This should spark 
conversations in the field about how to increase investment in a broader array of service 
providers who are eager to invest in their capacity to deliver and track outcomes, not 
just for those who are pursuing PFS opportunities. 
Expansion and rapid growth can be challenging for service providers, even 
with an infusion of upfront capital. One way to address or mitigate this challenge 
is a program design involving multiple service providers, with each adding a margin-
al amount of capacity. Multiple service providers can also be practical for projects 
working in a larger geographic region, like the Massachusetts chronic homelessness 
project which provides services in a number of communities spread across the state.  
Looking ahead, there are a handful of projects proposing a collective impact approach, 
whereby multiple service providers are able to offer a more holistic or comprehensive 
set of services. An individual service provider can thus play to their own strengths and 
experiences, and refer clients to other partners for services that they themselves do 
not offer. Ultimately, this is to the benefit of the client, who receives a combination of 
services that is most suited to their needs. Multi-provider models do create an added 
layer of work in the project development and management phases, as there must be a 
uniform process for eligibility assessment, recruitment and referrals processes, as well 
as centralized systems for data management. 
“Business as usual” versus innovation in service delivery. In most cases, 
services provided with PFS funds are nearly identical to “business as usual” for service 
providers. However, the recruitment or enrollment process for program participants 
often relies on a new or deepened partnership with government on the front-end of ser-
vice delivery for referral and enrollment. This is because demonstrated success is tied 
to the ability to recruit and serve the population that a back-end payor has prioritized. 
Thus, there is a level of innovation as well as operational risk that is not part of “busi-
ness as usual” for service providers. One way to mitigate this operational risk, which is 
increasingly common in PFS projects, is a ramp-up period that allows project partners a 
chance to operationalize and refine systems for referrals, enrollments, randomization (if 
there is an RCT evaluation), and data tracking, and/or phase-in services until the project 
reaches the target scale. Ramp-up periods take different forms: they can be either 
before or after formal project launch; they can be funded as part of the PFS transaction 
or separately by philanthropy; and individuals served may or may not be included in the 
project evaluation. An additional function of ramp-ups is that it allows projects to take 
advantage of timing of availability of other resources that are critical to project suc-
cess, if there is a mismatch in timing with PFS project launch; this was the case in the 
Massachusetts and Denver housing projects, where service delivery started in advance 
of project financing being finalized so that service providers could take advantage of 
available housing units.   
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Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
Single
Nonprofit
Alternative 
procurement method
Experienced with 
Critical Time 
Intervention (core 
intervention)
Voluntary enrollment 
of participants 
identified through a 
process led by county
Yes:
 6 month service ramp-
up period prior to PFS 
transaction launch; 
28 families served; 
grant-funded
Project Welcome 
Home
Single
Nonprofit
RFP
Experienced with ACT 
and permanent 
supportive housing 
(PSH); currently 
operates 30+ PSH 
programs
Voluntary
Yes:
3 month ramp-up 
period prior to PFS 
transaction launch; 
county-funded
 
Single or multiple 
service providers?
Service provider 
type(s) (nonprofit, 
government, 
private)
Service provider 
OR site selection 
method
Service Provider 
Experience with 
PFS Intervention
Referral Method 
for PFS Target 
Population
Did the project 
have a ramp-up 
phase? (Y/N; brief 
description)
NYC ABLE Project  
for Incarcerated 
Youth
Multiple
Nonprofit
RFQ to shortlist of local 
organizations
1 of 2 service providers 
had extensive 
experience running other 
cognitive behavioral 
therapy programs
Mandatory for all 16-18 
year olds attending 
school while detained 
at Rikers Island
Yes:
11 month period 
operating at half-scale 
(4 months prior to 7 
months post-project 
launch); services during 
pre-launch period 
provided in-kind 
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
Multiple
-Public 
-Nonprofit 
-Private 
-Charter school
Existing sites, plus 
expansion sites 
selected by 
intermediary
Public and nonprofit 
providers had already 
been implementing 
program with grant 
support
De facto enrollment 
for all students at PFS 
program sites 
No
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
Single
Nonprofit
Solicited as partner by 
successful bidder to 
state RFP for 
transaction coordinator
PFS intervention is 
proprietary to service 
provider
Voluntary enrollment by 
participants 
identified as high-risk 
by parole bureau given 
directive to participate 
in program as special 
condition of parole 
No
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
Single
Nonprofit
RFR from state for 
criminal justice 
service provider
PFS intervention is 
proprietary to service 
provider
Voluntary enrollment 
by participants 
identified as high-risk 
by evaluator and 
referred to service 
provider for outreach
No
Child-Parent Center 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
Single
Public
Expansion sites 
elected by Chicago 
Public Schools based 
on demographics and 
need
Existing 
implementation sites, 
plus expansion sites
De facto enrollment 
all students enrolled 
at PFS program sites
Yes:
1 year service ramp-
up period after PFS
transaction launch; 
only outcomes for 
students enrolled for 
full year counted in 
program evaluation 
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelesness Pay 
for Success Initiative
Multiple
Nonprofit
Selected by project 
manager from list of 
qualified providers 
pre-approved by state
Existing sites for 
Home and Healthy for 
Good model
Voluntary enrollment 
with referrals made 
through providers’ 
outreach and networks; 
participant eligibility 
determined using 
uniform risk/needs 
assessment
Yes:
6-month early-start 
clause to allow for 
service delivery before 
financing was final-
ized; 2 year ramp up to 
get to full housing unit 
capacity 
Housing to Health 
Initiative
Multiple
Nonprofit
RFP
Experienced providers 
of ACT, permanent 
supportive housing 
and other health and 
supportive services
Voluntary enrollment of 
participants identified 
by Denver Police 
Department with 
referrals 
coordinated by Denver 
Crime Prevention and 
Control Commission
Yes; 
6-month pilot period 
after project start 
date, prior to 
transaction launch; 
Individuals engaged 
during pilot period 
included in only 
housing success 
payments
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
Multiple
-Quasi-public
-Nonprofit
-Public
RFP for service 
provider intermediary
AllNine existing NFP 
implementing 
agencies in South 
Carolina included in 
project
Voluntary enrollment; 
referrals made by 
state Medicaid office; 
direct marketing to 
potential participants
Yes: 
3-month pilot period 
prior to project launch; 
paid for with non-PFS 
funds; participants 
tracked but not 
included in evaluation
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As multi-stakeholder agreements, PFS projects must have clearly-defined 
structures for project oversight and governance.  These structures are typically laid 
out in the main PFS contract, which is held by the project manager (or, in many cases, 
a special purpose vehicle wholly owned and managed by the project manager). Project 
oversight breaks out into two basic categories: operational and executive.
The operational oversight role focuses on regular monitoring of project prog-
ress. This can include review and troubleshooting of operational components of the 
project, and identifying and implementing any necessary course corrections identified 
in the process. Generally, operational oversight is handled by a committee that includes 
stakeholders involved in, or most closely tied to, project implementation, including 
service providers, and staff representatives of the government agencies or departments 
most closely aligned with the project’s target population or the source of repayment. 
Project managers often play a lead role in organizing and convening these committees 
and their regular meeting schedule. Data management systems to track and easily 
generate reports on program outputs and indicators are an important asset to these 
committees. Indicators or data points tracked at this level of oversight could include 
things like number of referrals made, number of participants enrolled, or days of 
services provided. These data points are more similar to the outputs tracked in a 
traditional government contract, and not necessarily indicative of project success or 
impact. Still, monitoring these outputs is important as these projects often have a good 
deal of implementation risk due to changed or deepened partnerships with government 
around referral and enrollment, and the ability to demonstrate positive impact is tied to 
service providers being able to hit targets for enrollment and levels of service provided. 
Executive oversight is typically handled by an executive or steering 
committee that monitors project progress through reports made by the project 
manager and/or operational committee. The executive or steering committee has 
decision-making authority over the PFS project, including for any changes in who fills the 
project manager and/or service provider roles. This committee is also the level at which 
any termination events or rights are exercised. Though the composition of the operating 
and executive committees looks similar in terms of the mix of stakeholders represented, 
there may be differences in who participates; the executive committee is more likely to 
have higher-level leadership, and the involvement of political appointees. 
Investors do not have decision-making power in PFS governance structures.  
They are, in some cases, allowed access to meetings of the operations or executive 
committees as non-voting members and typically have project termination rights that are 
defined in the PFS contract. Investors may receive reports on project progress as 
frequently as monthly. Reporting to investors is typically handled by the project manager. 
There are significant implementation risks in these projects. These risks are 
elaborated during the PFS contract development phase and can be incorporated as 
termination events in the contract. In most PFS contracts, there is at least one 
project-specific termination event, in addition to and distinct from the standard terms and 
language that are part of most contracts—PFS or otherwise. Some of these 
implementation risks are related to performance and capacity of project stakeholders, so 
there may be clauses for replacement of service providers or project managers, as well as 
clauses for contract termination and project wind-down if stakeholders are terminated but 
not replaced. There may also be termination events related to program design elements 
that are critical to project success but beyond the control of a project’s service providers or 
project manager.  This is most apparent in the Cuyahoga, Santa Clara County and Denver 
Housing to Health projects, which both rely on access to or commitments of publically-
funded housing resources and, in the Santa Clara and Denver cases, Medicaid reimburse-
ment for services provided. These resources are funded outside of the PFS transaction, but 
are integral to project design and intended impact. In cases like these, termination events 
can be exercised in the event that a public partner fails to commit adequate resources to 
ensuring project success. 
The potential failure by the back-end payor to fulfill its repayment obligations is 
often highlighted as a concern of investors. In reality, the repayment risk for a PFS 
project is not that different from that borne by a service provider in a multi-year contract 
with government. But, entering into agreements with private investors is a diversion from 
business as usual for government when it comes to contracting for social services; this 
practice is standard in municipal finance for public infrastructure and capital projects.  
Given the newness of the model, addressing appropriations risk has been an instrumental 
part of increasing investor confidence in early projects. The method of accomplishing this 
has varied by geography, and often requires legislative authority. The most common method 
is a set-aside account or sinking fund, where back-end payments are appropriated in whole 
or part; failure to do so can be grounds for contract termination in some cases. The most 
extreme example is Massachusetts, which has established a Social Innovation Financing 
Trust Fund backed by the full faith and credit of the Commonwealth.
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Operational 
Oversight Structure
[Note 1]
Frequency of meetings
Executive Oversight 
Structure [Note 2]
Frequency of meetings
Investor role in project 
governance?
Frequency of reporting 
to investors
Non-standard Contract 
Termination Events
[Note 3]
Appropriations Risk 
Mitigation Strategy
[Note 4]
NYC ABLE 
Project for
Incarcerated Youth
Operational Committee 
made up of project 
manager  and service 
providers’ staff
Every 1- 2 weeks
 
Program monitoring 
committee made up of 
New York City 
Department of 
Corrections and Mayor’s 
Office, service providers 
and project manager 
Monthly
None
Monthly reports; Quarterly 
meetings
1) Non-performance 
by service provider or 
intermediary
None
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
United Way of Utah as 
project intermediary 
manages day-to-day 
operations of program 
and reports to School 
Readiness Board
n/a
School Readiness Board 
housed within Governor’s 
Office of Management and 
Budget includes Dept. of 
Workforce Services and 
Board of Education 
representatives, appointees 
of State Charter School Board, 
and state House of Represen-
tatives and Senate leaders
Quarterly
None
Quarterly
None
Annual appropriation 
earmarked through 
legislation, reserved in 
restricted fund
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
Management 
Committee made up of  
NY State Depts. of 
Corrections and 
Community Supervision 
and Labor representatives, 
service provider, project 
manager and Government 
Performance Lab
Monthly
Executive Steering 
Committee made up of  
state officials from 
executive branch, Depts. 
of Corrections and 
Community Supervision 
and Labor, and project 
manager; service provider 
participation as special 
advisor/observer
Periodically, with 
quarterly updates
None
Quarterly
1) Termination of project 
manager by state for 
non-responsibility  with 
no replacement of project 
manager by state
Multi-year budget 
appropriations
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
Operating Committee 
includes representatives of 
project manager; 
Commonwealth 
Department of Youth 
Services, and Executive 
Office of Administration 
and Finance; service 
provider;  intermediary;
evaluator by invitation
Monthly
Oversight Committee 
includes representatives of 
project manager, 
intermediary, service 
provider executive 
director, commissioner of 
Dept. of Youth Services, 
and secretary of Executive 
Office of Administration 
and Finance
Quarterly
Can attend quarterly meet-
ings of Oversight Committee, 
and up to two meetings of 
Operating Committee, as 
non-voting member
Quarterly
1) Commonwealth and 
Senior lender have 
termination rights if 
cumulative program 
attrition exceeds Roca 
historical baseline by 
350% or more at end of 
year 2 or 3
Success payments backed 
by full faith and credit of 
Commonwealth
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
Operating 
Committee includes 
service provider, 
project manager, county 
representative and 
evaluator
1-2 times/month
Governance Committee 
includes service provider, 
project manager and 
county
Quarterly
Can attend any 
operational or governance 
meeting by request
Quarterly
1) Insufficient referrals or 
enrollments
2) Unavailability of 
adequate housing
3) Medicaid contract 
downsizing or termination
4) Increase in labor costs
Annual Appropriations 
into set-aside account
Massachusetts Chronic 
Homelessness Pay for 
Success Initiative
Board of Managers 
includes two 
representatives of 
project manager, and one 
representative each of 
fiscal agent and technical 
assistance provider
Monthly
Includes representatives of 
Commonwealth 
Department of Housing 
and Community 
Development and 
Executive Office of 
Administration and 
Finance, and Government 
Performance Lab
Quarterly
Can attend any 
operating or steering 
committee meeting as 
non-voting member
[Note 5]
As needed, with 
quarterly reports to state
1) Availability of 200 
housing units by end of 
year 2
2) State failure to allocate 
housing and Medicaid 
resources
3) Low retention of 
participants in housing 
Success payments backed 
by full faith and credit of 
Commonwealth
Project 
Welcome Home
Operating 
Committee includes 1 
County 
representative and service 
provider staff
Monthly
Executive steering 
committee includes 2 
county representative 
and 2 service provider 
representatives
Quarterly
Can attend any operating 
or steering committee 
meeting as non-voting 
member
[Note 2] 
Quarterly
1) Insufficient referrals/ 
underenrollment 
2) Insufficient supply of 
adequate housing
3) Substantial reduction in 
Medi-Cal funding
-Annual appropriations  
 part of county baseline 
 budget 
-Service provider can 
 terminate contract for  
 cause in case of annual 
 appropriations failure
Housing to Health 
Initiative
Operating Committee in-
cludes Denver Department 
of Finance and Division of 
Behavioral Health 
Strategies, service 
providers, evaluator, and 
project manager
2 times/month for first six 
months of project; monthly 
thereafter
Governance Committee 
includes City of Denver 
Chief Financial Officer, 
evaluator, service 
providers, project 
manager and investors
Quarterly
-May attend any 
 operating committee 
 meeting
-Included in governance 
committee
 
Quarterly
1) Inadequate volume of 
referrals or housing units/
subsidies
2) Changes to Medicaid 3) 
Policy changes that affect 
jail bed days 
4) Housing stability rate 
<50% by end of year 3
Success payments held in 
set-aside account
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Table 6: PFS Project Contracting and Governance
Child-Parent 
CenterPay for 
Success Initiative
Steering committee 
includes payors, project 
manager, technical 
assistance provider and 
local education experts
Monthly in first year, 
quarterly thereafter
Not available
Not available
Can attend any 
operational or 
governance meeting 
by request
Annually
None
Annual Appropriations 
into Escrow Account
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[1] Committee or working group involved in regular and/or day-to-day monitoring of 
project progress
[2] Oversight and decision-making body for PFS project
[3] Events which allow stakeholders to exit their contractual obligations, beyond those 
typically found in loan agreements and contracts
[4] Means by which to mitigate risk that funding is not available for investor repayment 
[5] CSH and the United Way of Massachusetts Bay and Merrimack Valley are both 
investors in the project. They are also part of the MASH Board of Directors as 
members of the project intermediary and the technical assistance provider and fiscal 
agent, respectively. 
[6] Under certain circumstances, investors can direct the service provider not to approve 
a certain course of action recommended by the operating or steering committee. This is 
articulated in the agreement between the investors and the service provider, which was 
not available for this report. 
         Table 6: Notes
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Contracting mechanism vs. financing structure. Increasingly, there is a distinction 
made in the PFS field between PFS as a contracting mechanism, and the way contracted 
services are financed. PFS as a contracting mechanism refers to the means by which 
an end payor contracts for the delivery of outcomes-based services. PFS financing that 
involves third-party, upfront investment as a source of funding for the outcomes-orient-
ed service delivery is often referred to as social impact bonds, a term borrowed from the 
United Kingdom that has proven confusing. It is possible that a PFS contract could exist 
without financing from a third-party. But most service providers, who are predominantly 
nonprofit organizations, do not necessarily have strong enough financial positions to 
cover the upfront cost of service delivery over the life of a PFS contract, particularly with 
the risk of not being repaid. Further, one of the most exciting aspects of the PFS model 
when it was first introduced was its potential to attract new sources of capital to the 
social sector. Traditionally, private and nonprofit investors have focused their social sec-
tor investments in real estate, through direct lending and the low-income housing and 
new markets tax credits, and to a lesser extent in working capital loans and small busi-
ness development. PFS financing presents the opportunity for direct investment in the 
outcomes produced by preventative and early intervention services—a largely untapped 
opportunity. It also provides an opportunity to align diverse stakeholders while enabling 
them to play to their core strengths: for service providers, this is delivering high-quality 
services; for investors, this is assessing and assuming financial risk.
PFS financing mechanisms have not been structured as bonds, but rather as 
direct loans. This is the source of confusion about the term social impact bond, noted 
above. Most projects to date have involved multiple investors, and the most common 
arrangement emerging is a layered capital stack with investments divided into senior 
and subordinate positions.  Traditionally, senior investors have their capital repaid first 
and thus bear less risk than subordinate lenders; in exchange for this lower risk posi-
tion, they are compensated with a lower potential rate of return. Subordinate investors 
are compensated with higher returns for agreeing to be repaid only after the senior 
investors.  In PFS financing, this model has been inverted:  most subordinate investors 
are bearing more risk by accepting repayment after senior investors, and a lower rate 
of return. On the continuum of impact versus financial return, this casts subordinate in-
vestors as “impact first” participants. This makes sense, given that subordinate lenders 
in deals to date have been philanthropies—entities accustomed to prioritizing impact 
above financial return with their investing and giving. 
There is little precedent or methodology for adjusting financial returns 
according to risk for social service program outcomes. As a result, the 
distinctions between senior and subordinate investors on projects to date have been 
highly negotiated and reflect the relative differences in risk tolerance between 
investors. Most deals to date have offered relatively modest returns for all investors, 
so the real distinctions between investor classes have been around priority and timing 
of repayment and, in Santa Clara County and Denver, payment on different outcomes. 
In both Denver and Santa Clara deals, one class of investor will be repaid on a shorter 
(and presumably less risky) success metric of housing stability, which is presumed to be 
a safe proxy for longer-term positive impacts. 
The pool of investors in PFS projects to-date is small, with some repeat inves-
tors, but has included a range of investor types: commercial banks, private, 
corporate and family foundations, philanthropic intermediaries (mainly United Ways), 
community development financial institutions (CDFIs) and high net worth individuals.  
High net worth individuals and institutional investors seeking impact investment 
opportunities remain largely untapped as sources of capital. Notable exceptions are: 
the New York State project, which used Bank of America Merrill Lynch’s private wealth 
management platform to raise money from individual investors; and an investment from 
Boeing, in the South Carolina project.  The relatively small size of investments may be 
an impediment to attracting these types of investors, as well as other sources of 
commercial investment. A next frontier of this work may be to create pools, or portfolios 
of projects, which could absorb larger infusions of capital and spread money (and risk) 
over multiple projects. But, this requires having a robust pipeline of projects, and would 
also create additional administrative and management costs. 
There is very little consistency across PFS projects in terms of the size of 
investment, composition of the capital stack, and the relative investment size 
of investors by type. Capital raised for PFS projects ranges from $3.5 million to $21.6 
million. Some transaction coordinators also report the commercial investors are 
looking for larger investment opportunities than most early projects have offered. Senior 
investment does tend to account for the greatest share of investment, though there has 
been a notable shift away from this trend in recent deals in Cuyahoga County, 
Massachusetts and Santa Clara County. This may be a reflection of a positive trend 
of more investors being interested in participating in PFS financing, or a less posi-
tive scenario of a limited, and risk-averse, pool of senior investors interested in PFS.                
         Section 7: PFS Financing Structure
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Alternately, it may be a response to the economics of the PFS projects themselves, 
where the relatively narrow margin between total project costs and the maximum 
repayment committed by the back-end payor requires most investors to be repaid at a 
lower rate.  In any scenario,  having multiple investors—as many as eight in the Denver 
Housing to Health project—creates the added challenge of investor coordination during 
the due diligence, underwriting and contracting process.  Transactions that rely on 
larger numbers of investors may need to identify new ways to more efficiently 
coordinate investor activity during the final stages of project development. 
PFS financing may be designed to leverage other public resources.  Notably, 
the five most recent projects—Cuyahoga County through South Carolina—have relied 
on the leveraging and targeted use of public resources in the form of housing subsidies 
and vouchers, and Medicaid-funded health services. Thus, the project budget for 
achieving the target outcomes is larger than the capital raised through the PFS financing 
mechanism. But, the financial modeling for the project—and the amount of money 
which is eligible for repayment—is limited to the capital raised from private sources. 
CDFIs have been involved in five of the first ten projects, including Nonprofit 
Finance Fund, CSH, TRF, Enterprise and IFF. CDFIs have filled a number of roles in the 
project development and implementation phases: not just as investors but also as 
transaction coordinators, project managers and technical assistance providers. The PFS 
investment opportunity provides CDFIs with the chance to apply their experience as 
financing intermediaries and lenders to the social sector, and respond to the needs of 
the sector in a new way. Some see the PFS market as a natural extension of their work 
in community development financing, with Community Reinvestment Act investing, low 
income housing and new markets tax credit investing and pooled investment funds. 
Still, the learning curve for all investors in PFS projects is steep, given that they are 
underwriting service provider performance rather than cash flow (or collateral), which 
involves a fundamentally different set of risks where outcomes are influenced by a lot 
of factors outside the control of the service provider. Most investors have limited 
experience in evaluating outcomes-based contracts and the corresponding type of risks 
that PFS projects present, including implementation risk related to program delivery, 
reliance on government for referrals and other resources critical to program success 
(e.g. housing, health care),  varying degrees of evidence supporting interventions, and  
appropriations risk. Further, there are more possible outcome scenarios for PFS projects 
which can make calculating the likelihood of repayment difficult. Lastly, traditional 
community development investing is typically done to support capital projects and is 
secured by real estate and sometimes, cash, receivables, future revenues or other 
personal property of the borrower. In PFS financing, the investors may only be secured 
by a lien on the account where project funds are held, and perhaps an assignment to 
partial repayment in the event of early project termination.
Philanthropy has played a role in all projects to date, and many early projects 
would likely not have been possible without significant philanthropic subsidy in the form 
of funds to support project development, subordinated investments, grants or 
guarantees, all of which essentially act as a form of credit enhancement to senior 
investors by providing increased assurance of repayment. This is an addition to critical 
philanthropic support for service providers for their ongoing service delivery, as well as 
capacity building efforts that enable them to participate in PFS projects. 
Philanthropy has also participated in PFS projects outside of the contract financing by 
funding evaluation or providing ongoing support to service providers and project 
managers. Some foundations have made their investments in PFS projects as program 
related investments (PRIs), which are defined as below-market rate investments whose 
primary purpose is charitable and not financial. For this reason, subordinate investments 
in PFS projects are a good fit for PRIs and may be used more frequently as foundations 
pursue impact investing strategies that broaden their traditional grant making activities.  
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  Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
[Note 5]
The Reinvestment 
Fund ($1.575)
-George Gund 
 Foundation ($1)
-Nonprofit Finance 
 Fund ($0.325)
-The Cleveland 
 Foundation ($0.750)
-Sisters of Charity  
 Foundation of 
 Cleveland ($0.2)
($2.275 total)
None
Sisters of Charity 
Foundation of 
Cleveland ($0.15)
None
None
Project 
Welcome Home
[Note 7]
-The Reinvestment 
 Fund ($0.5)
-CSH ($0.5)
($1 total)
-The Sobrato Family 
 Foundation ($1.5)
-The California 
 Endowment ($1)
-The Health Trust ($1)
-The James Irvine  
 Foundation ($0.28)
($3.8 total)
Abode Services ($0.5)
-Google.org ($0.5)
Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation ($1)
None
NYC ABLE Project  
for Incarcerated 
Youth
Goldman Sachs 
($9.6)
None
None
 
None
None
Bloomberg 
Philanthropies ($7.2)
Utah High Quality 
Preschool 
Program
Goldman Sachs 
($4.6)
J.B. and M.K Pritzker 
Family Foundation 
($2.4)
None
None
None
None
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch ($13.5)
[Note 11] 
None
None
None
None
Rockefeller 
Foundation ($1.3)
Massachusetts 
Juvenile 
Justice PFS 
Initiative
Goldman Sachs 
($9)
-The Kresge 
 Foundation ($1.5)
-Living Cities ($1.5)
($3 total)
-Roca Inc. ($3.26)
-Third Sector Capital 
 Partners Inc. ($0.05)
 ($3.76 total)
None
-Laura and John Arnold 
 Foundation ($3.7)
-New Profit, Inc. ($2)
-The Boston Foundation 
($0.3) ($6 total)
None
Child-Parent 
Center Pay for 
Success Initiative
 
-Goldman Sachs   
 ($7.33)
-Northern Trust 
 ($5.33)
($12.66 total)
J.B. & M.K. Pritzker 
Family Foundation 
($4)
None
None
None
 
None
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative [Note 6]
-Santander Bank ($1)
-United Way of 
 Massachusetts Bay  
 and Merrimack Valley 
 ($1)
-CSH ($0.5)
($2.5 total)
None
None
None
-Santander Bank ($0.25)
-United Way of 
 Massachusetts Bay  
 and Merrimack Valley 
 ($0.75)  ($1 total)
None
Housing to Health 
Initiative
[Note 8,9]
Housing Stability Outcome: 
-Northern Trust ($3)
-Walton Family Foundation ($1)
 Piton Foundation ($0.5)
Jail Bed Day Outcome:
-Nonprofit Finance Fund ($0.435)
-Laura and John Arnold  
 Foundation ($1.7)
-Walton Family Foundation
-Living Cities ($0.5)
-Colorado Health Foundation ($1)
-Denver Foundation ($0.5)
($8.6 total)
None
None
None
None
None
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
[Note 10]
None
None
None
None
-The Duke Endowment ($8)
-Consortium of private   
 funders ($4)
-BlueCross BlueShield   
 of South Carolina Fdn ($3.5) 
-The Boeing Company ($0.8)
-Greenville, SC First Steps 
($0.7)
($17 total)
None
         Table 7: Investors
Senior Investor/
Lender and Total 
Senior Investment 
($MM)
Subordinate 
Investor/Lender and 
Total Subordinate 
Investment ($MM)
Deferred Fee 
Source and Total 
($MM) [Note 1]
Recoverable Grant 
Source and Total 
($MM) [Note 2]
Non-recoverable 
Grant Source and 
total ($MM) [Note 3]  
 
Guarantor and 
Guarantee ($MM) 
[Note 4]
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[1] Deferred fees are delayed payments for the services provided by service providers, 
transaction coordinators and/or project managers. Deferred fees are one way of 
structuring projects so that more stakeholders have a financial interest in ensuring 
project success. 
[2] Philanthropies can use either their regular grant making protocols, or protocols for 
program-related investments (PRIs), to contribute to PFS capital stacks. If a foundation 
does not use a PRI, their investment may be structured as either a loan or a recoverable 
grant. The distinction between the two is in the expectation of repayment. A loan, even 
if from a philanthropic source, is expected to be repaid, and structured accordingly. A 
recoverable grant does not bear the same expectation of repayment. 
[3] Non-recoverable grants are traditional grants contributed to capital stacks; if the 
project is successful and generates full repayment, the non-recoverable grants can 
remain with the service provider or project manager, or be recycled by the original 
funder. 
[4] Guarantees were used in early projects as a credit enhancement for senior investors. 
Guarantees limit potential investor loss by repaying a certain portion of the investment 
in the case that repayment is not retriggered by project outcomes. Guarantees are not 
considered as part of the total capital stack, or PFS transaction funds. 
[5] The success of the Pay for Success intervention in Cuyahoga County relies on 
connection to stable housing. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), 
Emerald Development & Economic Network, Inc. and Famicos Foundation are local 
housing providers that will provide public housing and/or voucher-based housing 
resources for the program’s families. CMHA created a high-priority public housing 
preference for caregivers enrolled in the PFS program. The value of these housing units 
and vouchers is not included in the project budget or initial capital raised. 
 [6] Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness PFS Project leverages $18 million in public 
funding including $7 million for 145 project-based housing vouchers allocated by the 
Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development, and $11 million in 
health care services reimbursed by managed care entities.
[7] Project Welcome Home leverages $7.7 million in Medicaid-reimbursable mental 
health services and $4 million in County-subsidized housing units and vouchers. 
[8] The Housing to Health Initiative assumes leverage of an additional $16.15 million 
in public resources to support project service delivery, split as follows: $5.17 million 
in Medicaid funding; $5.42 million in housing vouchers from the Colorado Department 
of Housing; $5.42 million in housing vouchers from the Denver Housing Authority; and 
$143,000 in SSI/SSDI funding. In addition, the project relies on the construction of 210 
new housing units, financed with a $2.7 million low-income housing tax credit 
allocation and $3.2 million in gap financing from the city and state. 
[9] The Housing to Health Initiative did not use a senior/subordinate structure, but cre-
ated two tranches of investors. The first tranche, listed here as senior, receives payment 
on an outcome related to housing stability, and on an annual basis throughout the life of 
the project starting in year 2. The second tranche, listed here as subordinate, receives 
payment on an outcome related to jail bed day reduction, which is only measured at the 
end of the project period. 
[10] In addition to the $17 million raised from private sources, Medicaid will fund ap-
proximately $13 million via a 1915(b) Medicaid Waiver, awarded to the South 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services by the federal Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. 
[11] Bank of America Merrill Lynch raised $13.5 million through its private wealth man-
agement division. The investor group included 40 individuals, foundations, and family 
foundations. Several of the large foundations included in the investor group, including 
the Robin Hood Foundation, are not eligible for credit enhancement from the Rockefeller 
Foundation, the guarantor, but are otherwise subject to the same repayment terms as 
other investors. 
         Table 7: Notes
                 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
25
20
15
10
5
0
25
20
15
10
5
0
       NYC             UT            NYS            MA             CHI             OH              MA            SCC           DEN             SC
                                                                JJ                                                    PSH           PSH                               NFP
        NYC           UT           NYS           MA           CHI           OH            MA           SCC          DEN           SC
                                                            JJ                                               PSH          PSH                            NFP
In
ve
st
m
en
t S
iz
e 
($
M
ill
io
ns
)
In
ve
st
m
en
t A
m
ou
nt
 ($
M
ill
io
ns
)
Corporate
Service Provider(s)
High Net-Worth Individuals
Philanthropic-Recoverable
Philanthropic-Non-Recoverable
CDFI
Commercial Bank
Senior Debt/Investment
Subordinate Debt/Investment 
Deferred Fees
Recoverable Grants
Non-Recoverable Grants
         Capital Stack by Investor  Type Capital Stack Composition by Investment Type
28
There can be up to three types of payments to investors in a PFS transaction: 
annual interest; repayment of investment or principal; and return on 
investment. Annual interest can be paid regardless of project performance or out-
comes, while capital repayment and success payments are tied to performance of the 
service provider and the achievement of pre-agreed upon outcomes, as measured and 
confirmed by the project’s evaluator. Investor repayment can occur throughout the life 
of the project’s implementation, after the project’s conclusion, or both. In some 
projects, the timing of repayment is the differentiating factor between senior and 
subordinate investors, with senior investors getting repaid first. 
Repayment may be based on observed differences between the project’s 
treatment and control group, or on outcomes observed for individual 
participants served. This can be observed in the different events that trigger 
repayment. For example, in the New York City, New York State, Cuyahoga County and 
Denver projects, there is a minimum threshold of difference between the treatment 
and control or comparison groups which must be met in order for any repayment of 
principal to be made. In contrast, other projects make repayment based on any 
observed positive outcome amongst the treatment group using a set per person or per 
outcome rate. 
In most cases, investors can be partially repaid their principal, with full 
repayment of upfront investment, as well as any potential return on investment, tied 
to higher rates of outcomes being achieved. Rates of return may also vary according to 
level of outcome achievement, as in the Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness project. 
There is no standard methodology for calculating investor return, and the methodology 
for doing so is agreed upon investor contracts which are not available publically and 
were not included in this report’s analysis. Projects may use return on investment (ROI) 
or internal rate of return (IRR) methodology to determine repayment calculations. In 
general, rates of return are below market. This can actually be an enabling factor for 
philanthropies who are using PRIs, which are defined, in part, as below-market 
investments.
The timing of investor repayment varies based on the type of outcome, eval-
uation methodology and investor class. Most PFS projects have service delivery 
periods in the range of four to six years, but the horizon for investor repayment is often 
longer because the period of observation over which to measure the target outcomes 
         Section 8: Repayment Terms
extends longer. Indeed, this longer time horizon is linked to the core tenet of PFS of 
tying funding to outcomes. By definition, outcomes are observed in a longer time frame 
than outputs, which can be tracked in real-time. For example, a workforce development 
program could report on a number of outputs within the short term: individuals who 
completed a job training program, received a skills certification, and found a job.  But, 
a success outcome might be the number of people who find and keep a job for a period 
of several years, and exhibit sustained and increasing earnings; this would be indicative 
of longer-term stability in their lives. For this reason, there is often a lag between when 
the service delivery period ends, and final repayment is announced based on evaluation 
results. Early childhood projects, in particular, can have a long “tail” in terms of investor 
repayment because evaluations may involve longitudinal tracking of students. Both the 
Chicago and Utah projects track students through sixth grade; for subordinate investors, 
who are only repaid if and when the senior investors have been fully repaid, this can 
result in very long horizons for full repayment: 17 and 12 years, respectively. 
Recent projects have also used different outcomes to trigger repayments to 
senior and subordinate investor groups, or tranches of investors in the case of the 
Denver Housing to Health Initiative. This is a reflection of differences in risk tolerance, 
and is only possible for interventions where there exist some strong short-term proxy 
measures that can be linked by strong evidence to longer term measures of success. For 
example, in housing projects, housing stability for one year with minimal interruptions 
is considered to be a strong indicator of longer term stability and retention in housing, 
with the associated positive benefits of improved health, and reduced use of emer-
gency services and criminal justice systems.  Similarly, for early childhood education 
programs, measures such as kindergarten readiness can be correlated to greater rates 
of academic achievement continuing through primary and secondary school, based on 
existing longitudinal studies.  
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Initial Investment ($Millions)
Maximum Repayment Funds Committed 
by Payor ($Millions)
Full service delivery term (years)
Full repayment period (years)
Interim outcomes reported? 
Tied to payments?
Sustainability/Recycling of Funds
NYC 
ABLE Project 
for 
Incarcerated Youth
$9.6 
$11.7 
4 (projected)
3 (actual)
4 (projected)
3 (actual)
Yes/Yes
Any unspent portion 
of guarantee to be 
used by intermediary 
to facilitate future 
transactions
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
$7.0
Not available 
4
12
Yes/Yes
None specified
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
$13.5 
$21.6 
4
5.5
Yes/No
None specified
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
$21.76 
$27.0 
7
7
Yes/Yes
1) State could serve 
an additional 390 
individuals if the 
project is successful, 
using federal grant 
funds
2) Any repaid 
philanthropic support 
will be invested in 
future PFS projects 
and/or service 
provider scaling
Child-Parent 
Center
Pay for Success 
Initiative
$16.9 
$34.0 
4
17
Yes/Yes
None specified
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
$4.0 
$5.0 
4
5
No/No
Philanthropic funding 
could be remitted 
to service provider 
if repaid as success 
payment
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
$3.5 
$6.0
5
6
Yes/Yes
1)Housing 
vouchers and 
Medicaid services 
will remain with 
participants
Project 
Welcome Home
$6.9 
$12.0
6
6.25
Yes/Yes
1) Recoverable grant 
will be reinvested 
into service provider 
for capacity building 
2) Nonrecoverable 
grant will be 
reinvested in county
Housing to Health 
Initiative
$8.6 
$11.4
5 
5
Yes/Yes
[Note 6]
None specified
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
$17 
$24.5 
4
5
Not available
Philanthropic 
supporters will invest 
any sucess payments 
in service provider 
for sustained service 
delivery
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Interest
Trigger for initial repayment of principal
[Note 1]
Threshold for full repayment of principal
Threshold for full repayment of principal 
plus maximum success payments
Repayment timing 
Return to Investor [Note 2]
Success Payment to Other 
Stakeholders? [Note 3]
NYC 
ABLE Project for 
Incarcerated Youth
None
8.5% reduction 
between control and 
treatment
10% reduction 
between control and 
treatment
20% reduction 
between control and 
treatment
Year 3 (Final)
11% to 22%
No
Utah High Quality 
Preschool Program
None
Any difference 
between predicted 
and actual use of spe-
cial education services 
for treatment group
~90% avoidance of 
special educationfor 
students deemed 
at-risk
Not available
Senior: annually, 
years 3-10
Subordinate: after 
senior investment 
repaid
5% + municipal 
money market rate, 
with a maximum  rate 
of 7.26% [Note 4]
No
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
None
1) Employment 
outcome:  5% 
percentage points
increase in 4th 
quarter employment 
compared to control 
group
2) Recidivism and 
transitional work 
outcome:~37 day 
decrease in average 
incarceration days 
compared to control 
group 
10% reduction in 
recidivism
40% reduction in 
recidivism
Year 4; Year 5.5
~13.2% maximum
Yes:
Project manager
Massachusetts 
Juvenile Justice 
PFS Initiative
5% (senior) and 2% 
(subordinate) base 
annual rate
1) Jail Bed-Day 
Outcome: 
5.2% decrease in 
days incarcerated
 2) Job readiness 
outcome: Participant 
engages with youth 
worker ≥9 times in 
one quarter
3) Employment 
outcome:  Participant 
earnings ≥$1,000 in 
one quarter
40% reduction in 
incarceration days
70% reduction in 
incarceration days
1)Incarceration 
outcome:Bi-quarterly 
starting in year 5 
2) Job readiness 
outcome: Bi-quarterly 
starting at Q7 
3)Employment 
outcome: Bi-quarterly 
starting in year 5 
 
-11% maximum 
  (senior lenders)
-18% maximum
 (subordinate lenders) 
Yes: 
Service provider and 
project manager
Child-Parent 
Center Pay for 
Success Initiative
Not available
1) Special Education 
Outcome: Any positive 
difference between 
treatment and control 
group 
2) Kindergarten 
Readiness Outcome:
Any positive 
difference between 
treatment group and 
national averages 
3) Third Grade Litera-
cy: Same as above.  
Not available
Not available
Senior: 
annually, year 2-9 
Subordinate: 
annually, year 10-17
6% (average)
Not available
Partnering for 
Family Success 
Program
5% (senior) and 0% 
or 2% (subordinate) 
annual rate
2% difference 
between treatment 
and control groups 
in out-of-home 
placement days
25% reduction in 
out-of-home 
placement days
40% reduction in 
out-of-home 
placement days
Year 5
Success payments 
up to $1 million to 
subordinate lenders
See below
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
0 – 5.33% annually, 
based on success 
rates [Note 5]
40% rate of 12 
months of housing 
stability
80% rate of 12 
months of housing 
stability
94% rate of 12 
months of housing 
stability
Year 6
See Note 5
No
Project 
Welcome Home
5%; (senior); 
2% (subordinate/
PRI); 0% 
(Philanthropic)
Client achievement 
of three months of 
housing stability
Not available
83% of clients 
achieve 12 months 
of housing stability
Annually, starting 
at the end of year 1
Not available
Yes
[Note 6]
Housing to Health 
Initiative
None
1) Housing Stability: 
Client achievement 
of 12 months of 
housing stability
2) Jail Days: 
20% reduction
1) Housing Stability: 
83% 
2) Jail Days:
 30% reduction
1) Housing Stability: 
100% 
2) Jail Days: 
65% reduction
1) Housing Stability:
annually, starting 
after quarter 6
2) Jail Days:
after year 5
3.5% (expected rate 
of return)
No
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Not available
Yes:
Service provider
[Note 8]
Table 8.2: Detailed Repayment
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[1] Initial repayment does not equate to full principal return. Investors may recover only 
part of their principal if projects do not meet a certain level of success.
[2] ] There is no standard methodology for calculating investor return. These numbers 
are what is publically reported, and comparing from one project to another may not be 
an apples-to-apples comparison for the reason of potentially different calculation 
methodologies. Calculation methodologies may be provided in investor agreements 
which are not available publically and were not available for this report’s analysis. 
[3] Success payments for other stakeholders such as project managers and service 
providers create a financial incentive for project success. 
[4] For the first cohort of students, investors will be repaid an additional $1,040 per 
student year for avoided special education services after principal has been fully repaid. 
[5] Private investors receive interest at a rate calculated and paid annually, starting at 
the end of year 2, based upon level of success that is achieved by service providers. 
[6] Success payments for higher rates of success are made to the service provider, who 
in turn will pay 25 percent of any success payments received to investors. 
[7] Housing stability outcomes are reported starting in year two and tied to repayment. 
An interim report on observed jail bed days for the first three years of program imple-
mentation will be released in late 2018, but not tied to repayments. 
[8] Success payments will be reinvested in service delivery. 
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The project development process is long and time-intensive. This is unsurpris-
ing, given the newness of the model, but many stakeholders hope to see the 
development process shorten as there are more examples in the field to draw on and 
more expertise available to help expedite project structuring. To date, projects have had 
development timelines ranging from 18 months to three years and have relied on active 
participation from all stakeholders in order to reach project launch. The costs incurred 
by stakeholders are largely provided in-kind to the project or supported by grant 
funding, and therefore neither compensated using funds raised through PFS financing, 
nor accounted for in any accounting of project costs. 
Transaction coordinators are typically compensated for their services during 
the project development phase. Payment may come through a contract with either 
the government sponsor or the service provider, or in some cases with philanthropic 
support. Alternately, some transaction coordinators are pursuing a model of being paid 
retroactively at project launch using funds from the capital raise. This is typical in 
traditional structured finance and real estate development deals so it is a model 
familiar to many investors and financial intermediaries. Further, for some PFS leaders, 
this arrangement is a way to make the field self-sustaining, and not as reliant on 
philanthropic funding. A project manager’s role during implementation is also covered 
using transaction funds. This has implications for the size of the overall project 
investment as well as the project’s financial model and budget. 
All transaction coordinators to date are philanthropically-funded organiza-
tions, in whole or part, which has allowed them to absorb excess costs through their 
regular business models. Many stakeholders hope to see the reliance on philanthropy 
and Social Innovation Fund grants decrease as the market matures, which would signify 
greater sustainability of the field. Still, some degree of philanthropic support will 
likely continue to be useful to transaction coordinators, who want to retain the ability 
to engage in project development for projects they find compelling but where project 
stakeholders might not be able to support the upfront cost of project development. 
Nevertheless, the need for philanthropic support is one barrier to entry for new entrants 
to the PFS market. One innovation in the project development phase are development 
loans, a product developed by Living Cities, to cover project development costs and be 
repaid by the investment raised for the project. This is supporting a handful projects 
currently under development. 
Negotiating program contracts and fundraising are within the regular scope 
of work for service providers, but the time required by PFS projects has far 
exceeded initial expectations of all stakeholders and cannot be overstated. 
Further, PFS project development and negotiation requires the time and attention of 
high-level staff, including chief executive and financial officers and program directors. 
Few organizations have been fortunate enough to receive dedicated funding for this 
work, with the exception of several early recipients of Social Innovation Fund support 
and in a few communities where PFS exploration has been driven by, or in 
partnership with, the philanthropic community. This was the case in Santa Clara County 
and Cuyahoga County, where philanthropic support of government, transaction 
coordinators and/or service providers was critical to the project exploration and 
development processes. There is also an opportunity cost to pursuing PFS and some 
service provider leaders have raised the question of what opportunities they missed 
during the time that their senior leadership was focused on PFS. These costs are 
difficult to quantify and weigh against the benefits of participating in PFS, which can 
also be much bigger and farther-reaching than the dollar value of the PFS transaction. For 
example, many service providers report that the PFS opportunity served as a forcing 
mechanism for them to focus more intently on connecting program delivery to out-
comes, and they see that this heightened focus can help them deepen their impact 
and mission fulfillment and also potentially open new doors for funding that have not 
previously been available to them. 
Transaction costs for early PFS projects have been high and have raised 
concerns from various stakeholders. There is no agreed-upon definition for what 
constitutes a transaction cost, but we use it here to describe the expenses that exist 
by virtue of a project using a PFS contracting and financing approach, and which would 
not exist in a more traditional philanthropic grant or government contract.  Generally 
included in the transaction cost category are costs associated with: evaluation design 
and implementation; legal services for contract development and review; auditing and 
accounting of the entity or special purpose vehicle that serves as the fiscal sponsor for 
PFS financing; transaction coordination in the project development phase; and project 
management by an intermediary in the project implementation phase. It is difficult to 
compare transaction costs from project to project because there has been significant 
variation in what is covered by the PFS transaction versus other sources of funding, 
and what is provided in-kind. As a result, there is no strong or clear consensus on 
the average or acceptable dollar amount of transaction costs, or the target share of 
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transaction costs as a percentage of total capital raises.  Additionally, any accounting 
of project costs begs for deeper dissection to determine how much of what is referred 
to as project costs are narrowly tied to PFS project development, versus broader, and 
overdue, investments in government and service provider capacity and infrastructure for 
data tracking and outcome measurement. 
All projects have relied on sources of support not covered by the PFS transac-
tion in the project development phase as well as in the project implementation 
phase. In the project development phase, the most common sources of uncompensated 
support are pro bono legal services, and technical assistance from the Government 
Performance Lab in the form of a dedicated government fellow to support project 
development. An emerging best practice is to have evaluators involved as early as 
possible in the project development process, which also creates an added cost. In 
recognition of this, the Laura and John Arnold Foundation made a grant to the Urban 
Institute in 2015 to provide pro bono technical assistance around evidence and 
evaluation; this was used in the Housing to Health Initiative. 
In the project implementation phase, there are also often additional costs 
for resources or program elements that are critical to successful program 
implementation, particularly in projects with a housing or health care component. In 
fact, these projects are designed to leverage existing public resources such as housing 
vouchers and Medicaid/Medicare expenditure, and allocate them in an efficient and 
targeted way so as to meet the needs of vulnerable, high-need populations. While 
these resources are not usually included in the reported project cost or budget, they are 
critical to project success. Related to this idea of PFS as a tool for achieving more 
efficient allocation of resources, many government PFS advocates highlight that the 
cost of PFS project development and associated transaction costs is really the cost of 
government innovation and behavior change, and that investments made in specific 
projects will actually have much farther reaching consequences for how governments 
contract for social services. Thus, as difficult as it is to get to the full picture of project 
costs, it may be even harder to measure the full benefits produced by PFS work. 
As can be expected with any new product or process, the project development 
and transaction costs for early projects are high because the learning curve 
is steep for all stakeholders and there are few examples or templates to draw 
from. As the field develops, the time and associated cost of project development may 
decrease, as there are more examples, resources and experienced stakeholders. Still, it 
remains to be seen whether the changes to the cost structure will be marginal, which 
would likely limit the growth of the PFS field, or substantial enough to enable stream-
lining and mainstreaming of the PFS contracting and financing mechanisms. Alternately, 
early projects may offer proof of concept or sufficient evidence of program effectiveness 
to empower government to fund proven programs in their own municipalities without 
the complexity of the PFS structure.  
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Partnering for 
Family 
Success Program
County and service 
provider costs for 
project development
-George Gund 
 Foundation
-Cleveland 
 Foundation
-Sisters of Charity  
 Foundation
-Medicaid 
 reimbursements 
-Housing vouchers
 and units
-Ramp-up period
-Laura and John  
 Arnold Foundation
-Cuyahoga County 
-Public and private  
 housing providers
Project 
Welcome  Home
-Feasibility 
 assessment
-Transaction 
 coordinator fees
-Health Trust 
-James Irvine 
 Foundation 
-Social Innovation 
 Fund 
-Santa Clara County 
-$7.7 million in   
 Medicaid services
-$4 million in 
 housing units and  
 vouchers
-Santa Clara County 
-State of California
NYC ABLE 
Project  for 
Incarcerated Youth
Transaction 
coordinator fees
Bloomberg 
Philanthropies
-Evaluation 
-Project 
 Intermediary
Bloomberg
Philanthropies 
Utah High Quality 
Preschool 
Program
-Transaction 
 coordinator fees
-Technical 
 assistance provider
United Way of Salt 
Lake 
-Evaluation
-Project 
 Intermediary
State of Utah 
Increasing 
Employment and 
Improving Public 
Safety
-Government 
 Performance Lab
 Fellow 
-Legal services 
Pro bono legal 
support
-New York State 
 project and data  
 management costs 
 for evaluation
-Validator
-Project Intermediary
-US Department of 
  Labor 
-Social Finance
  (in-kind project   
  management)
Massachusetts 
Juvenile 
Justice PFS 
Initiative
-Government 
 Performance Lab 
 Fellow
-Legal services 
Pro bono legal 
support
Not available
Not available
Child-Parent 
Center Pay for 
Success 
Initiative
 
Government 
Performance Lab 
Fellow
Not available
Evaluation
Finnegan Family 
Foundation 
Massachusetts 
Chronic 
Homelessness 
Pay for Success 
Initiative
-Government 
 Performance Lab  
 Fellow
-Legal services 
Pro bono legal 
support
-$7 million in 
 housing vouchers
-$11 million in 
 Medicaid services
Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 
Housing to Health 
Initiative
-Evaluation design
-Evidence review
-Legal services
-Government 
 Performance Lab 
 Fellow
-Transaction 
 coordinator fees
-Urban Institute 
 (partial in-kind  
 services)
-Pro bono legal  
 support
-Social Innovation  
 Fund 
-The Piton Foundation
-Denver Foundation
-Kaiser Permanente
-Rose Community 
 Foundation
-$10.8 million in 
 housing vouchers
-$5.2 million in 
 Medicaid funding
-Evaluation
-State of Colorado 
-City of Denver 
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Project Development Costs 
Not Covered by PFS Capital Raise
Funding source(s) for project 
development costs, if any
Project Implementation Costs 
not covered by PFS Capital
Funding sources for implementation 
costs not covered by PFS capital
South Carolina 
Nurse-Family 
Partnership
-Government 
 Performance Lab  
 Fellow
-Transaction 
 coordinator and  
 service provider  
 intermediary fees
-Legal services
Pro bono legal 
support
-$13 million in   
 Medicaid-funded  
 services
-Project pilot period
-South Carolina 
 Department of 
 Health and Human 
 Services (via 1915 (b) 
 Medicaid waiver) 
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Since Pay for Success was first introduced to the United States in 2010, the PFS market 
has established itself as a small but rapidly growing and evolving feature of the social 
sector landscape. Ten projects have gone from concept to implementation, and there are 
dozens more in development. When PFS was first introduced, it was defined fairly 
narrowly as a tool for scaling proven interventions that could demonstrate cost savings. 
While the use of evidence and the potential for cost savings remain two powerful 
motivators, they are not the only reasons why PFS is used. Early projects demonstrate 
that practitioners have applied the tool creatively, and in ways that depart from the initial 
construct of PFS, to help advance solutions to persistent community issues and needs.
We do not expect that the first generation of PFS projects, detailed in the report, will 
serve as a “how to” guide or template for future projects but we do expect that these 
early projects will help spur even greater momentum around outcomes-based 
contracting and financing approaches. Further, there may be lessons and opportunities 
that early projects can offer that can reduce the cost and complexity of future projects by 
introducing efficiencies in the project development phase. Finally, early projects can 
inform funders and service providers looking to be more strategic in how they allocate 
their limited resources in order to achieve better outcomes for the communities they 
serve. The first ten PFS projects only scratch the surface when it comes to the greater 
potential that PFS has to spark innovation in delivery, evaluation, contracting and 
financing. The proliferation of interest in PFS from governments at all levels and in all 
corners of the United States speaks to the potential of the PFS model as one tool to 
further much larger, and far-reaching, changes in how social services are provided and 
funded in this country, by both the public and private sectors. 
Already we have seen that PFS efforts require adaptation and collaboration on the part 
of all stakeholders involved. We anticipate that the next five years of the market’s devel-
opment will bring even greater diversity to the PFS market as stakeholders continue to 
adapt the model, as more communities that strive to achieve a better alignment between 
their goals and their deployment of resources. PFS is but one front in a movement toward 
an outcomes-oriented social sector that better delivers high-quality, effective services to 
communities in need. Collaboration between service providers, foundations and govern-
ments is imperative to navigate this systemic shift. Our challenge—and opportunity—in 
the next phase of the PFS market’s development is not to advance a particular financial 
innovation, but to collectively improve our ability to deliver better results. 
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